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Critics of the EU's democratic deficit standardly attribute the problem to 
either socio-cultural reasons, principally the lack of a demos and public 
sphere, or institutional factors, notably the lack of electoral accountability 
due to the limited ability of the European parliament to legislate and control 
the executive powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 
Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need prove 
problematic. The first adopt a rights-based view of democracy and claim a 
European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of 
Fundamental European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to 
EU wide democracy, thereby overcoming the demos deficit. The second 
adopt a public-interest view of democracy and argue that so long as 
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delegated authorities enact policies that are 'for' the people, then the 
absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy 'by' the people are 
likewise unnecessary - indeed, in certain areas they may be positively 
harmful. This paper argues both arguments are normatively and empirically 
flawed. For no consensus on rights or the public interest exists apart from 
the majority view of a demos secured through parliamentary institutions. To 




Criticism of the EU’s democratic deficit has standardly centred on the absence of a 
European demos and the shortcomings of its institutional arrangements. Though related, 
these two arguments also work against each other to some degree. Those who emphasise 
the first critique focus on the low levels of popular identification with the EU, a factor 
associated with apathy and even antagonism towards EU politics. According to this 
argument, the lack of a European ‘demos’, along with the complexity and distance of 
European decision making, necessarily weakens the potential for EU-wide democracy. 
Advocates of the second critique tend to respond that political identification would be 
strengthened by enhancing the role of democratic institutions within the EU, particularly 
the European Parliament. However, supporters of the no-demos thesis counter that such 
measures would deepen rather than alleviate the EU’s democratic deficit. Without a 
demos, EU wide democratic decision-making risks producing the majority tyranny of one   3 
or more demoi over others. On this view, there are limits to what the EU should attempt 
to achieve if democratic accountability and legitimacy are to be retained. 
Recently, this debate has been reinvigorated by two approaches to the problem 
that challenge the respective presuppositions of these conventional positions. In rather 
different ways, these scholars relate the EU’s legitimacy problems and democratic deficit 
to parallel difficulties and changes within the democracies of most advanced industrial 
societies, many of which stem from the impact on nation states of the very global 
economic and social processes that have given rise to the EU. As a result, the Member 
States are said to have been similarly afflicted by a weakening of affective national bonds 
and a loss of confidence in the competence of politicians.
2 They argue that the virtual 
absence of a demos-based, majoritarian parliamentary model of democracy at the EU 
level merely reflects its attenuation and partial replacement by new forms of democratic 
legitimation at the Member State level. 
What I shall call the ‘rights-orientated’ strand of this argument suggests EU wide 
democracy can work, but it needs to be established on a new basis to some form of 
European identity.
3 This strand stresses how citizens now tend to justify their claims in 
terms of rights and regard them as constraints on the behaviour of their compatriots and 
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politicians. A commitment to justice is said to be a more powerful political bond within a 
pluralist society than ethnicity, history or shared cultural values. Most important, it offers 
the prospect of a post-national form of democracy suited to the EU. After all, the EU has 
created a transnational legal system guided by international norms of rights and the rule 
of law. Though EU law originated to secure the basis for a common market, it has 
reached beyond the narrowly economic sphere. It now disseminates standards of equality 
and fairness in a whole range of areas: from consumer protection to the recognition of 
gay relationships. The Charter of Rights and Constitutional Treaty are seen as the 
culmination of this process and said to offer an alternative, civic, basis for a pan-
European constitutional democracy to a shared European identity of an ethnic or cultural 
kind similar to the nationalisms of the Member States. As they note, the potential for 
rights protection at the EU level already provides a focus for many transnational civil 
society groups. 
By contrast, what I shall call the ‘public interest-orientated’ strand, while not 
indifferent to these concerns, argues that democratic accountability plays a diminished 
role in the operation of most states.
4 It proves not just unnecessary but potentially 
pernicious. EU governance simply reflects this situation. According to this strand, what 
matters most to citizens are the securing of certain goods – such as high employment, 
economic growth and environmental protection. Citizens no longer look to states to 
provide these directly but indirectly, through regulation. Moreover, policies in these areas 
are often highly technical and susceptible to being distorted to favour particular powerful 
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private interests. What people want in such fields are expertise, efficiency and equity. 
They look for Pareto-efficient improvements that correct for market failure. Proponents 
of this strand argue that the democratic output of policies that reflect such public interests 
do not require – indeed they may even be subverted by – too much democratic input. 
There should be consultation with affected parties, but this exercise is for information 
gathering not to promote democratic accountability or responsiveness. Even at the 
domestic level, technical regulatory issues tend to be delegated to unelected expert 
bodies.  To the extent the EU merely oversees those regulatory problems best tackled at 
an international level, and of a kind that democratic politicians in any case handle badly, 
then the relative absence of direct democratic control poses no problem. In fact, 
intergovernmental democratic bargaining would inevitably raise transaction costs and 
might well produce distorted and suboptimal outcomes as politicians sought to protect a 
variety of national level interests. The indirect control and checks provided by elected 
politicians within the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are sufficient.  
  These two views appear to be at variance with each other: the one advocating the 
expansion of democracy on a new basis, the other defending the attenuation of older 
forms. Indeed, some advocates of ‘the rights-orientated view’ have criticised what they 
regard as the utilitarian and instrumental emphasis of ‘the public interest- orientated 
view’.
5 Yet that criticism is not entirely fair. For the ‘public interest’ view sees the 
technocratic setting and upholding of regulatory standards as a parallel to, and 
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constrained by, the judicial maintenance of rights standards.
6 In that respect, the rights-
based view also seeks to limit democracy. Moreover, to a surprising degree the two views 
share certain common normative assumptions: namely, that impartial procedures, 
fostering deliberation and openness among well-informed and appropriately motivated 
persons, and consulting with affected civil society groups, will generate a consensus on 
rights or the public interest in their respective areas.  
 The following examination of these two accounts concentrates primarily on a 
normative assessment of their common core. In contrasting ways, both views claim they 
are more ‘realistic’ than the standard critiques of the EU’s democratic deficit. The ‘rights-
orientated’ theory takes issue with the ‘no-demos’ thesis and contends the emphasis on 
nationality as a source of political identity harks back to an outmoded, and often malign, 
ideal of cultural and ethnic homogeneity.
7 The ‘public-interest’ view criticises those 
seeking more democratic-decision making within the EU for applying highly idealised 
standards of an ‘ancient, Westminster-style’ democracy.
8 However, I shall argue that both 
views involve idealised assumptions of their own that are only credible in the context of 
the very positions they criticise. 
  The basic problems can be summarised as follows: 1) Both rights and the public 
interest are subject to reasonable disagreement. As a result, democratic legitimacy cannot 
be secured by arriving at an ‘objective’ view of rights or the public interest that all 
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European peoples could be assumed to espouse, regardless of whether they are actually 
involved in reaching that view or not. 2) When independent bodies, such as courts or 
regulators, set such standards they are often controversial. Within established 
democracies public pressure can be brought to bear on these bodies in ways that render 
them broadly responsive to sustained majority opinion. Such pressures are often indirect 
and inadequate, yet when ignored, in whole or in large part, they give rise to concerns 
about a national democratic deficit. 3) To the extent a consensus exists on rights or the 
public interest it is because it reflects the majority view of a demos. Therefore, the 
possibility of such consensuses cannot be used as substitutes for collective democratic 
decision-making among a people who accept its legitimacy because they feel a sense of 
commonality and acknowledge the authority of the state to decide issues of public 
concern within its territorial sphere. If at least part of the reason the EU suffers from a 
democratic deficit lies in the absence of a demos, then that deficit may be intensified 
rather than diminished by the development of EU level rights or regulatory standards 
possessing minimal democratic endorsement or control by a yet to be created European 
people. 
  I shall start by outlining the nature of such disagreements and the role democracy 
can play in deciding them. I shall also briefly explore whether democracy at the EU level 
possesses the same normative qualities to perform this role as at the Member State level. I 
then look in more detail at the merits of the post-national rights-orientated view of EU 
democracy and a public interest based delegatory democracy. Both are found wanting, 
with the democratic deficit a continuing problem. 
   8 
Democracy and Disagreement 
The vast majority of citizens within democracies believe in the importance of rights and 
regard certain state activities to be in the public interest. However, they also disagree 
about the character and substance of both, and often divide over the policies most 
conducive to securing them. No doubt self-interest, prejudice and ignorance lie behind 
many of these differences. However, they also stem from nothing more sinister than the 
limitations of the human condition. Not only can various worthwhile goals and values 
prove either contingently or logically incompatible, and so cannot be contained within 
one social world, but also our evaluations of which mix should be preferred are subject to 
conflicting appraisals. Such conflicts need not reflect bias or bad faith but simply what 
Rawls’s calls ‘the burdens of judgement’.
9 These burdens range from the difficulty of 
weighing empirical evidence to the conscientious employment of differing normative 
standards. All these elements can produce divergent opinions among even reasonable, 
well-motivated people. Indeed, they lie at the heart of most political debates and 
divisions. Debates between right and left over the best mix of public and private in 
running the economy or the legitimacy of social rights are both legitimate and enduring 
precisely because they do not admit of any definitive, knock down solution – even if 
academics and politicians on each side of these and other issues attempt to offer their 
alternative answers. 
The existence of reasonable disagreement in these areas makes the assumption of 
an underlying European (or national) consensus on rights or the public interest 
debateable. It also poses a difficulty for the ‘objective’ setting of standards by supposedly 
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impartial bodies, such as courts and regulators. Either they will disagree as much as the 
rest of the population, or their agreement will reflect a somewhat false professional 
consensus that fails to take into account many factors that legitimately matter for ordinary 
people.  
Within democracies such as those existing in all the Member States, the problem 
of reasonable disagreement is largely overcome through appeals to rights and the public 
interest being nested within a national public sphere and democratic system. Indeed, 
Albert Weale and Jeremy Waldron see reasonable disagreement on matters that 
nonetheless require a mutually acceptable collective decision  as framing the 
‘circumstances of democratic politics’ in much the same way Hume and Rawls regarded 
moderate scarcity and limited altruism as forming the ‘circumstances of justice’.
10 Four 
factors lead citizens to accept the authority of democracy to resolve their differences in 
these cases. The first three factors serve to establish a political community, the fourth 
concerns the character of democratic decision making. First, they must share certain 
common interests and acknowledge that various collective decisions have to be made if 
their lives are to go well and social cooperation is to be possible. For example, in the case 
of certain co-ordination problems, having an agreed collective decision, even one you do 
not like, can be better than the uncertainty resulting from having no agreed decision at all. 
Second, the institution towards which the democratic decision is directed must have de 
facto and de jure authority over the issue – it can actually deliver and is widely regarded 
as being entitled to do so. Third, there has to be a degree of trust and solidarity among 
citizens. They need to believe their fellows will honour their mutual obligations and stand 
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by decisions that go against them, and be prepared to make sacrifices to promote certain 
public goods and common purposes. Finally, they regard democracy as a fair procedure 
for selecting a collectively binding decision. Two common misconceptions about 
democracy need to be avoided in this regard. The language of preferences can suggest 
collective decision making to be about satisfying conflicting wants. This characterisation 
misdescribes the nature of political choice. Rather than straightforwardly expressing their 
own wants, voters are offering judgements on the nature of their common interests and 
the best ways to promote them. However, democracy is not about producing the ‘right’ 
answer on these matters either. Those on the losing side of a democratic vote rarely 
concede they were wrong – at most they admit to having misjudged the public mood and 
may even endeavour to win people round next time. People typically accede to a 
democratic vote to resolve, rather than to dissolve, their continuing disagreements. 
Indeed, democracy’s attractiveness lies in its not requiring their substantive agreement in 
order to arrive at an agreed decision. It simply offers a fair way of overcoming 
differences of opinion that is not intrinsically biased towards any given decision. This 
fairness consists in treating different views on an equal basis and responding to the 
majority opinion. It also allows mistakes to be corrected and the losers to try again by 
permitting the periodic revision of decisions and the removal of those responsible for 
them. 
11 
A number of features of actually existing democratic decision-making are worth 
noting for what follows. First, even local democracy usually involves a large degree of 
delegation to elected representatives. Switzerland apart, citizens rarely vote on individual 
                                                 
11 On both these caveats see Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Ch. 5 and Weale, 
Democracy, Ch. 7.   11 
policies. Rather, they elect politicians to enact political programmes. Basically, elections 
screen for politicians possessing certain qualities of political leadership and build 
coalitions between different groups of people, often by log-rolling and arranging trade-
offs between their various policy objectives. By allowing those politicians who 
disappoint to be deselected, elections provide an incentive for them to pursue policies that 
are in the interests of stable majorities. This system does not rely on voters offering 
expert opinions on how the economy works, the causes of crime and the best means of 
reducing it or any other complex policy issue. They merely choose between the different 
policy prescriptions of the parties in contention and judge on results. As Max Weber 
noted in a famous analogy,
12 elections in this respect resemble consumption in the market 
– most voters no more know how to run the country than they know how to make shoes,  
but they know when the shoe pinches and likewise when governments fail.  
Second, within all democratic states certain policies are delegated to bodies that 
are either formally outside the control of democratically elected politicians, or only very 
indirectly subject to them  – such as central banks, courts and other independent 
regulatory agencies. However, these bodies are not thereby isolated from any political 
pressure. Both politicians and public opinion more generally will express views on their 
performance. Usually, these bodies respond to sustained criticism. Moreover, 
supplementary political action is often required to give real effect to their decisions – 
giving politicians an indirect source of control.  
Finally, the first three of the four factors noted above are, on most accounts, 
considerably weaker at the EU level than in the Member States. Eurobarometer polls 
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reveal that on average a (bare) majority of Europeans believe they benefit from the EU 
and view EU institutions reasonably favourably, indicating that by and large the first 
factor applies – if only for just over 50% of EU citizens. So, by implication, does the 
second factor – at least for the limited policy sphere in which the EU operates. That said, 
support is lukewarm even among pro-Europeans. Strong enthusiasm for the EU, like 
hardline Euroscepticism, is a minority pursuit.
13  However, identification with the EU and 
fellow Europeans is far lower, suggesting that the third factor of trust and solidarity is 
very weak. By and large, around  3% of citizens generally view themselves as 
‘Europeans’ pure and simple, with barely 7% saying a European identity is more 
important than their national one. By contrast, approximately 40% describe themselves as 
national only and 47% place nationality first and Europeanness second. Indeed, though 
89% of these citizens usually declare themselves attached to their country and 87% to 
their locality, only 58% feel attached to the EU.
14  
                                                 
13 E.g. When the image of the EU is broken down into ‘very positive’ and ‘fairly 
positive’, then around 7-10% opt for the former category and 35-40% for the latter. A 
similar division can be found in most assessments of the EU, with the overall positive 
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As we shall see, ‘public interest’ defenders of the EU’s democratic deficit often 
argue that criticisms of the EU’s political arrangements apply unrealistic democratic 
standards. However, it does not seem wildly utopian to expect a degree of democratic 
accountability and control concerning the overall direction of EU policy, the performance 
of individual decision-makers and the impact of particular decisions – particularly if, as I 
shall argue below, the deliberations of delegated bodies prove more contentious than is 
claimed. The issue then becomes how far such democratic control is achieved, possible or 
acceptable within the EU. Those who cite the absence of a ‘demos’ as a limiting factor on 
EU democracy normally focus on the weakness of the first, second and third factors. The 
‘rights-orientated’ strand comes in here, arguing that a common commitment to justice 
rather than a shared national identity and public culture provide the best basis for trust 
and solidarity. The difficulty with this argument is that the ties of justice apply to all 
human beings – not just one’s fellow citizens. Moreover, they are themselves deeply 
contested. As such, they are too thin and controversial to bind citizens to a specific state 
as the locus where disagreements about their collective interests and rights might be 
appropriately negotiated and decided.
15 In addition, a shared culture often provides a 
common language that facilitates public discussion. Though there are many multilingual 
states and most are multinational, they have tended towards ever greater autonomy of 
subnational and sublinguistic units. The key issue concerns how far a set of common 
entitlements and concerns can allow the EU to buck this trend. 
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Rights-Orientated Post-National Democracy 
The rights-orientated, post nationalist strategy conceives the EU ‘as building on … 
principles and rights that are uniquely European and normatively uncontroversial, since 
every Member State subscribes to them and since these moral norms are increasingly 
spread worldwide.’
16 Their ‘presumption is that public support will reside in a 
constitutional patriotism, which emanates from a set of legally entrenched fundamental 
rights’.
17 These rights provide the basis ‘both for protecting the integrity of the individual 
(private freedom) and for making possible participation in the opinion-formation and 
decision-making processes (that is, political rights that establish public freedom.)’
18 
Indeed, these rights are supposedly both the foundations for and the product of a 
‘European public sphere’. 
  I think all these claims are flawed. As I have already noted, there is a problem 
with viewing rights as sources of a European political identity given their allegedly 
universal status. That ambivalence is present in the contradictory statement, cited above, 
to the effect that these principles are ‘uniquely European’ and yet ‘increasingly spread 
worldwide’. They can be hardly be both. If these rights ought to be (and to a large degree 
are) upheld by all liberal democracies, including those outside Europe - such as the 
United States, India, Australia or Japan, then they do not provide grounds in and of 
themselves for any sort of  ‘uniquely European’ allegiance.  
Meanwhile, the belief that rights are ‘normatively uncontroversial’, in part ‘since 
every Member State subscribes to them’ is too simple. All Member States do ‘take rights 
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seriously’. All adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights and have domestic 
Bills of Rights of various kinds and some form of rights-based judicial review. But 
though they share roughly the same liberal democratic values, their valuations of them 
frequently diverge.
19 For example, though all acknowledge a ‘right to participate’, 
‘freedom of speech’ and the other ‘political rights that establish public freedom’, they 
have very different political and electoral systems. Consequently, they interpret 
citizenship rights in correspondingly diverse ways. They also employ different 
constructions of the fundamental rights ‘protecting the integrity of the individual’, or 
‘private freedom’, such as the right to life. Thus, Belgium and the Netherlands are the 
only Member States that currently allow certain forms of euthanasia, and even they 
define and regulate it differently.  
These different valuations not only differ from each other but also may conflict. 
For example, Germany understands privacy and its relationship to freedom of speech 
somewhat differently to Britain. As a result, Chancellor Schroeder was able to prevent 
Die Bild reporting certain details about his personal life that The Sun was allowed to 
publish. Moreover, not only do Member State valuations often conflict with each other, 
but they may also clash with the valuations offered by the ECJ at the EU level, as cases 
such as Grogan notoriously revealed.  
These differences render the notion of rights providing a ‘normatively 
uncontroversial’ basis for EU democracy somewhat problematic. The aspiration was to 
see these rights as somehow transcending national differences, but they now seem to be 
shaped by them. Of course, it might be objected that all these countries already subject 
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themselves to certain common international rights regimes, and accept the rulings of 
international courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights. Arguably, these 
regimes do pose problems for a democrat. After all, one of the reasons Britain had for 
incorporating the ECHR was to ‘domesticate’ the European Convention by ‘bringing 
rights home’, as the White Paper introducing the Human Rights Act put it. However, 
even placing these difficulties to one side, there is a qualitative difference between the 
role of an international rights regime, such as the ECHR, and the aspirations 
postnationalists have for an EU rights-based order. The former operates at the margins. 
Its function is to ensure that all signatories provide political arrangements and policies 
that can be regarded as plausible readings of the European Convention and to protect 
those, such as asylum seekers or foreign nationals, who have no voice in the country’s 
democratic system. Consequently, the ECHR employs abstract formulations compatible 
with widely differing valuations of rights and grants a ‘margin of appreciation’ to states 
in many cases. The latter aims to bring into being a European public sphere based on a 
shared understanding of rights and so motivate agreement on a federal structure for 
Europe that in various ways goes beyond national allegiances and political cultures.
20  
As we have seen, at present no such shared understanding exists – indeed, it has 
been the attempt of the ECJ to give a ‘Community’ reading of certain rights that departs 
from their national meaning that has often been a cause of constitutional friction between 
it and the constitutional courts of the Member States.
21 That does not mean that Member 
States cannot participate within a common political system. However, they do so in ways 
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that reflect rather than transcend national traditions. For example, though elections to the 
European Parliament occur under common rules, Member States interpret their European 
political rights in slightly different ways – using different variants of PR, voting on days 
that fit with local practices and, most importantly, mainly campaigning on domestic 
issues and debates about Europe under the guise of the same parties that contest national 
elections. European Parties are largely a post-hoc creation within the European 
Parliament, with a European public sphere – to the extent it exists – being found only 
among Euro-elites. The absence of a common language, media, political culture and the 
growing size of the EU all make a genuine EU public sphere unlikely.  
European law and rights has been correspondingly ‘inter-national’ in character – 
an on-going dialogue between different national jurisprudential traditions, negotiated 
between the ECJ and the courts of the Member States, notwithstanding the former’s 
insistence on Supremacy, Direct Effect and its own competence-competence.
22 After all, 
the ECJ’s development of a rights jurisprudence came in large part as a result of rights-
based challenges from national constitutional courts. The post-nationalists believe these 
practical compromises detract from a potential European normative consensus, risking 
incoherence and potentially injustice in the process. Yet, given the diversity of European 
views on rights, such a consensual view would be a false imposition.  
Postnationalists make two responses to this sort of critique. The first rests on the 
role and supposed democratic credentials of constitutional courts as mechanisms for 
determining the view of the political community. After all, disagreements about rights 
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Sonderweg’ in J. H. H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond 
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exist within the Member States as well as between them. In many countries, a court 
resolves these disputes rather than a democratic process. However, some commentators 
contend this solution need not be seen as anti-democratic but rather as a way of giving 
effect to the underlying principles of democracy, notably the showing of equal concern 
and respect to all citizens, in ways that democratic procedures  may not through 
majorities being influenced by prejudice, ignorance or vested interests. Surely, the ECJ 
would be acting no differently in being the authoritative interpreter of the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights? It would be compensating for the inadequacy of 
European democratic procedures by expressing the substance of a pan-European 
democratic consensus.  
As with the earlier comparison with other international courts, there is a 
difference of degree. National Courts are not nearly so insulated from democratic 
influences as the ECJ. They belong to the domestic political system and come under a 
great deal of direct and indirect democratic pressure. The US Supreme Court is often 
portrayed as a model of how rights-based judicial review can forge unity and reinforce 
democratic values within a federal system. Yet, analysts of the Court have observed how 
throughout its history it has faced periodic democratic challenges, often shying away 
from federal adjudication for long periods as a result.
23 Few successful Court decisions 
can fly in the face of sustained national majorities – not least because without legislation 
and government action to promote and enforce them, they are likely to fall into neglect. 
Moreover, the main successful anti-majoritarian decisions of the US Supreme Court do 
not provide a particularly edifying example of the democracy promoting role of courts or 
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their defence of weak minorities. Made during the Lochner era, these struck down some 
150 pieces of labour legislation improving working hours and conditions. Only the 
overwhelming democratic endorsement of Roosevelt’s New Deal could right these 
injustices. Anti-majoritarian checks can not only protect individual rights, but also favour 
entrenched privileges and vested interests. Litigation tends to be an expensive business, 
with legal avenues in the EU – as elsewhere – being disproportionately exploited by 
corporate bodies.
24 Used excessively, litigation can also stunt the evolution of 
democratic, collective problem solving, and divert attention to ultimately self-defeating 
forms of individual redress, particularly in the area of compensation and liability.
25Within 
the EU, where the absence of a European people or public sphere makes it hard to talk of 
a European majority or, were it to exist, for it to exert much pressure, the dangers of a 
Court reinforcing rather than diminishing the EU’s democratic deficit are particularly 
strong.   
The postnationalists’ second response enters here. They argue that the Charter and 
the Constitutional Treaty, which incorporates it and makes the ECJ the authoritative 
interpreter of both, can also claim a degree of procedural democratic legitimacy through 
being produced by a process of democratic deliberation and subjected to subsequent 
democratic endorsement by either a referendum or parliamentary vote in each of Member 
States.
26 Many postnationalists have set great store by the ‘convention method’.
27 Though 
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unelected, the conventions used to draft the Charter and Constitution were comparatively 
representative bodies. Unlike IGCs, they contained a majority of national and European 
parliamentarians alongside government and commission representatives, and consulted 
widely with civil society groups. As a result, the main national, supranational and 
transnational positions were included, along with the central ideological divisions found 
within each – even if some groups, notably women and ethnic minorities, were 
conspicuous by their relative absence. Most importantly from their advocates’ point of 
view, decisions within the conventions were taken not by majority vote but by seeking a 
consensus. Deliberative democrats contend that, on matters of constitutional principle at 
least, this requirement should lead to participants relinquishing self-serving and partial 
views and converging only on those reasons and conclusions that would be acceptable to 
free and equal individuals. In this way, an ideal European democratic process was to give 
rise to the foundations for a real European democracy.  
It is one thing to regard consensus as the logical goal of democratic deliberation, 
another to believe it a likely or the only rational outcome. Obviously, postnationalists 
were all too aware of the limitations of any actual deliberative process. However, they 
tend to regard all differences stemming from national interests or ideological divisions as 
illegitimate, the product of partiality or prejudice.
28 Yet, their source may well be an 
alternative understanding of rights, freedom and equality. As we saw, the ‘burdens of 
judgement’ make reasonable disagreement on such matters possible. Given that 
innumerable seminars have not produced a consensus among philosophers on these 
issues, it is perhaps no surprise that the conventions failed to do so. Instead, they 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Eriksen and Fossum, ‘Europe in Search of Legitimacy’ p.  453. 
28 Eriksen and Fossum, ‘Europe in Search of Legitimacy’ p.  454.   21 
generated numerous compromises, with many disagreements being resolved by framing 
the right or clause so abstractly as to be compatible with almost any reading. In essence, 
the Charter – and even more the Constitution – represent not a normative consensus, but 
the most acceptable pragmatic solution to the practical problems currently facing EU 
decision making that those involved could agree to.
29 
Their status as a time bound compromise rather than a timeless consensus 
substantially weakens the claims that can be made for these documents. They reflect the 
best deal that elites representing different national and European interests could negotiate 
in present circumstances, not a move towards pan-European democracy. The subsequent 
referendums and parliamentary debates appear to confirm this scenario. Rather than 
exercises in pan-European idealism, the key issue has been whether they will ensure that 
on balance the country concerned benefits rather than loses from EU membership. At 
best, the Constitution represents a reasonable modus vivendi for regulating the 
interactions of the various demoi within the EU. As we have seen, quite a few European 
citizens doubted even that. 
There is a vicious circularity to the postnationalist argument. It posits an ideal 
democratic European consensus as both the underpinning and the potential result of a 
(properly constructed) real European democratic process. In other words, it makes an 
assumed European demos the pretext for attempting to bring it into existence. Any failure 
for this putative demos to emerge gets attributed to shortcomings in the current ground 
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rules. Yet, this thesis builds its conclusions into its premises, and in practice puts the cart 
before the horse. Though both the normative and empirical bases for the postnational 
argument are questionable, the plausibility of each rests on the truth of the other. Absent 
any consensus, then, as I noted, disagreement standardly gets overcome through 
majoritarian decision making – but that assumes a demos of the kind postnationalists seek 
to do without. Indeed, given that the EU has to cope with diversity as well as 
disagreement, the current rules with their more consociational and Madisonian features 
are arguably more legitimate than majoritarian ones would be. However, whether they 
can claim, or need, democratic legitimacy remains at issue. 
 
Public Interest Orientated Delegatory Democracy 
This position more or less forms the starting point for theorists of the public interest 
model of delegated democracy. They criticise many democratic theorists for applying 
ideal, utopian criteria to the complicated reality of the EU, noting that proposals for 
improving democracy must be not only philosophically coherent but pragmatically 
viable.
30 They contend it is the very absence of a European demos that legitimises the use 
by the EU of ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions.
31 Indeed, in many areas – particularly those 
that most concern the EU – they note that a subset of such non-majoritarian mechanisms, 
namely expert, regulatory bodies, have become standard even in otherwise majoritarian 
democratic systems. Yet, curiously a similar putative European consensus, this time of a 
technocratic kind, underlies their arguments. 
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  Delegation, the focus here, has a different rationale to many other non-
majoritarian schemes. As Majone rightly notes, 
32 in complex, plural societies, where the 
dangers of factionalism and minority oppression are said to be greater, it is common to 
adopt mechanisms aimed at sharing, dispersing and limiting power. Given the EU is split 
by a number of deep cleavages, from the distinction between small and large states, to 
differences of language, religion and political culture, the use of such non-majoritarian 
mechanisms seems appropriate. As we saw, the basic rationale for majoritarian decision 
making is that it is a fair procedure among people who share common interests for 
deciding among their different judgements as to how these might be best pursued. Many 
of these non-majoritarian schemes share that same logic. They simply note that for some 
purposes certain groups’ interests may not be common, or may be viewed so differently 
as to make common rules for determining how they should be pursued unsuitable. Thus, 
the standard form of dispersing power is to devolve it to a particular locality or region. 
The aim here is to select the functionally or culturally appropriate majority for the issues 
in question. The prime strictly non-majoritarian strategies arise where there are 
territorially dispersed consistent minorities, making the federal/devolved option 
unavailable. These seek to secure either a threshold voice for a given group or a degree of 
proportionality in decision-making in order to protect the special interests of those 
concerned. By contrast, delegation - at least in the area of regulation - assumes that all 
concerned have common interests, but that, for one reason or another, the judgements of 
ordinary people or those of their chosen representatives are suspect.
33  
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Underlying the ‘public-interest’ account is a crucial distinction between 
redistribution and regulation.
34 Redistribution is a zero-sum game. As such, it requires 
democratic endorsement to legitimise the transfer of resources from one group to another. 
However, regulation aims at improving efficiency and should be a positive-sum game 
where everyone gains. Such measures dominate the EU agenda and include the removal 
of trade-barriers to improve the functioning of the market, the promotion of food and 
safety standards that render us all healthier, and the correction of market failures by 
tackling such negative externalities as pollution. Yet, though intended to make us all 
better off, they prove more contentious than the advocates of delegation maintain.  
As they at least partially acknowledge, the distinction between redistribution and 
regulation is not clear cut. Regulation aspires to secure diffuse, long-term benefits, but 
invariably imposes short-term costs on assignable groups and individuals, often in very 
specific geographical locations. Thus, many EU regulations have significant 
redistributional effects with identifiable winners and losers. For example, they tend to 
favour transnational corporations over smaller enterprises producing for the domestic 
market. Delegation theorists address this problem by arguing that within the EU a 
condition of ‘no wealth effects’ holds.
35 That is, the temporary, adverse effects of a 
regulatory outcome can be overcome by compensatory measures through the Social 
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Fund, the European Investment Bank and other similar mechanisms. However, these 
‘political’, redistributive decisions can and should be separated from the technocratic, a-
political policy decision about the best means to promote aggregate welfare through 
enhancing efficiency.  
  Putting to one side the degree to which the ‘no wealth effects’ condition truly 
holds in the EU, the argument still remains problematic. ‘Efficiency’ can be a contested 
value – both in itself and more especially as a synonym for sound, mutually beneficial 
policies that promote the public interest. Like rights, it is subject to the ‘burdens of 
judgement’.  Different normative considerations and conflicting empirical assessments, 
including over what evidence is relevant or not, can all lead to as many disagreements 
among experts as there are likely to be among ordinary citizens. For example, small, 
family run farms may produce fewer crops and at greater expense than larger farms, but 
they may also be more eco-friendly and preserve rural communities, minimising certain 
social problems in the process. The efficiency of one over the other is a normative 
judgement, while calculating the costs and benefits of each to come up with a ‘no wealth 
effects’ solution is highly problematic. Thus, not everyone will regard rural communities 
as worth preserving, the costs of not doing so may turn on a number of contingent factors, 
there will almost certainly be various unanticipated knock-on effects, while the whole 
chain of cause and effect may be hard to disentangle. Different social and moral theories 
are likely to highlight different aspects of the problem. Consequently, it is hard to think 
of a technical or economic decision with no discretionary elements. 
  Advocates of delegation have tended to respond to these concerns by contending 
that democracy remains inappropriate nonetheless, while the process of expert decision-  26 
making can claim certain democratic credentials. These two claims largely parallel those 
defending the democracy promoting properties of judicial review and constitutional rights 
examined in the last section: indeed, courts have come to play an increasing role as the 
people’s tribunes in regulatory governance.
36 They also prove similarly flawed. Like the 
equivalent rights-based arguments, they tend to overstate the parallels with the apparently 
analogous domestic arrangements and mischaracterise the purpose and nature of 
democracy. Let’s take each in turn. 
 Democratic accountability is deemed inappropriate because potentially it has 
huge transaction costs in such areas and introduces biases favouring well-organised and 
influential sectoral interests. Delegation at the EU level has the particular advantage of 
overcoming the under-representation or blocking at the national level of the interests of 
diffuse transnational minorities or even majorities. Moreover, the issues are claimed to be 
not that electorally salient for most citizens anyway. They tend to be highly technical and 
often arcane matters that even elected politicians are happy to delegate to experts. 
Politicians may also want to delegate so they can make long term commitments in 
contentious areas that will not be subject to the vagaries of the electoral cycle while being 
able to shift the blame on to others should these policies prove unpopular.
37 
Though plausible enough in theory, many of these arguments prove normatively 
suspect and practically unfounded. For a start, shifting the possibility of being blamed for 
contentious policies may not only be a means of insulating long term interests against 
short term popular myopia or prejudice, but also a way of evading political responsibility 
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for poor decisions. Complaints of an EU democratic deficit stem in part from the 
tendency of national politicians to attribute certain economic or other failings to decisions 
by an anonymous ‘Brussels’, without acknowledging their own part in them. Second, 
most political decisions involve abstruse technicalities. However, politicians generally 
specialise in particular areas and get used to consulting, and evaluating, the advice of a 
range of expert advisors. Moreover, like ordinary citizens, they tend to be especially and 
legitimately sensitive to the good or bad consequences of policies. Third, Moravscik and 
Majone arguably overplay the domestic analogy, underestimating the ways elected 
politicians control non-majoritarian regulatory bodies in the Member States. The 
autonomy of domestic regulatory bodies is generally limited by various screening and 
sanctioning mechanisms that allow the political principals to control their technocratic 
agents. Though many formal instruments appear too costly and arduous to employ with 
any regularity, potentially impugning the neutrality of the agency and thereby 
undermining its chief asset, or risking associating the political principals with any failure, 
a range of less overt and informal measures arguably prove more effective. By selecting 
friendly yet independent experts, with no direct party or other link to government, and 
managing the effectiveness of the body through their hold on information or role in 
implementing its recommendations, politicians can shape the institutional incentives in 
such ways that regulators propose congenial policies.
38 At the EU level, the plurality of 
principals and the ability of the Commission to develop a complex network of 
overlapping agencies, all reduce this influence while introducing the dangers of 
conflicting forms of accountability. Meanwhile, the possibilities for regulatory capture 
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are increased by the closeness of EU regulation to various ‘stakeholders’ – notably 
business and unions.
39 Finally, domestic regulators come under diffuse public pressure 
from the media and other organs of the national public sphere – a pressure that is far 
harder to exert at the EU level given the virtual absence of a pan-EU public sphere. 
For example, the paradigm case of delegated regulatory power is often taken to be 
the fixing of interest rates by a central bank.  Typically viewed with approval,
 40 there is 
always the danger these regulators will serve the interests of the financial community 
rather than those of producers and consumers. For far from being pure technical 
exercises, such decisions have an obvious political dimension involving as they do 
judgements over the best balance between the risks of inflation and those of higher levels 
of unemployment.
41 As we saw, appeals to efficiency do not get us very far because the 
factors that might lead one to characterise one position as more ‘efficient’ than another 
may be partly ‘ideological’. Different economic theories tend to involve value and other 
judgements that favour and draw on different political perspectives. As a result, the 
separation of ‘policy’ from ‘politics’ is far from clear cut.   
These are also decisions that ordinary citizens have a strong interest in, even if 
most would not claim to have a very sound knowledge of how the economy works or 
much of an interest in fiscal policy per se. Defenders of delegation sometimes write as if 
those worried by the EU’s democratic deficit are advocating a return to ancient Greece 
and judging its arrangements by ‘an ideal form of perfectly participatory, egalitarian, 
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deliberative politics.’
42  Thus, Moravscik proclaims that ‘We do not expect complex 
medical, legal or technical decisions to be made by direct popular vote’.
43 Quite – but 
whoever suggested we did?
44 By and large, we leave such decisions to professional 
politicians, who, operating in committees and government departments – invariably with 
the advice of experts, reveal themselves able to formulate very sophisticated policies in 
such sensitive and technical areas as taxation. As I remarked above, democratic 
accountability usually gets exercised post-hoc, when the ‘shoe’ fails to ‘fit’. Citizens may 
be poor economists but they know when the economy lets them down. Democracy is all 
about giving politicians an incentive to respond to the needs of the public rather than 
powerful sectoral interests or fashionable economic theories.  
Within the Member States, regulatory bodies tend to be embedded within a 
national democratic culture. Even if banks control interest rates, they can come under 
public scrutiny via the press and considerable indirect political pressure.
45 Indeed, in the 
UK (as in New Zealand) the inflation target is set politically, and the Governor can be 
held accountable if the Bank fails to meet it. The same is true of other regulatory bodies, 
especially those in the service sector where popular sensitivity to their actions is high. 
Here too, policy, as opposed to its implementation, remains firmly under political control. 
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By contrast, such scrutiny is often limited at the EU level. The ECB is particularly 
insulated, being able to make legally binding regulations without involving the national 
or European parliaments or other EU institutions.
46 For the reasons explored earlier 
regarding the absence of an EU wide public sphere, informal pressures are also much 
harder to achieve for EU bodies.  
Defenders of delegation attempt to rebut some of these criticisms by invoking the 
democratic qualities instilled of the regulatory bodies themselves. Though delegation 
aims to isolate the policy-making process from politics, it is said to possess many of the 
formal, procedural attributes of democratic decision-making.  Great play has been made 
in recent accounts of their ‘deliberative’ and ‘professional’ qualities, whereby experts - 
who are normally national appointees, and so supposedly representative of various local 
interests – come to adopt more ‘cosmopolitan’ and impartial outlooks.
47 However, we 
have seen there are no reasons for believing deliberation will any more produce a 
consensus on ‘efficiency’ than on ‘rights’. If any argument involves a naïve, utopian 
idealisation of the democratic processes, it is surely this claim. Should a consensus 
emerge, then it probably bears witness simply to the current dominance of a particular 
view among the profession.
48 As such, this apparent consensus will reflect more the 
common identity of the body’s members as ‘experts’ than a convergence of national 
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interests. Nor should we regard the isolation of the decision from such concerns as a good 
thing. Experts have an unfortunate tendency to overlook issues that are legitimate worries 
for ordinary folk. People’s everyday contact with doctors, lawyers and other 
professionals means they are well aware that experts can make mistakes or overlook the 
dilemmas facing those they are supposed to serve. Their use by politicians to bolster 
unpopular decisions has also resulted in their being scarcely distinguishable from their 
political masters. Certainly, episodes such as BSE and the French Blood scandal have 
somewhat tarnished technocracy in the eyes of European citizens. Of course, politicians 
can introduce compensatory measures post-hoc when certain groups are adversely 
affected. But it seems naïve to expect the national politicians likely to be held responsible 
for such costs to wait until the damage is done before seeking to rectify it – especially if 
they have to gain the consent of possibly unaffected European partners in order to do so. 
It’s partly to address these problems that there have been moves to make 
regulatory bodies more transparent and consultative. Majone, in particular, appeals to the 
American experience in this regard.
 49 However, the US proves an ambiguous model, 
with the differences as instructive as the parallels.
50 The US bodies originated as 
creatures of the highly democratically legitimate Roosevelt Presidency as a way of 
overcoming some of the counter-majoritarian checks on the Federal administration. Their 
opening up was championed largely by a Supreme Court suspicious of technocracy and 
Presidential power. The aim was not to depoliticise these bodies but to ensure a greater 
degree of political balance within them.  Unfortunately, these measures have had mixed 
results. The guarantees of openness and participation have been mainly used by those 
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interest and other groups best able to organise and fund a team of counter-experts to those 
favoured by the regulators. Their efforts have often produced regulatory capture or expert 
stalemate, with specialist courts ending up making the decisions. Majone echoes certain 
US scholars in justifying this judicial control of the regulatory process as the most 
functionally appropriate means for protecting individual rights through its being 
‘insulated from political responsibility and unbeholden to self-absorbed and excited 
majoritarianism’.
51 Thus, a measure that began as a majoritarian initiative for overcoming 
entrenched counter-majoritarian privileges and interests blocking federal schemes has 
now been turned into yet another counter-majoritarian strategy, albeit one that claims to 
articulate a consensus on the public interest and rights. We have come full circle, with the 
regulatory case for delegation dove-tailing with the rights-based argument. Yet, as we 
saw, both the threats posed by majoritarianism and the democracy and rights promoting 
credentials of courts are at best contentious. Indeed, there has been something of a 
democratic backlash against the US agencies amid calls for more effective Presidential 
coordination of economic and other policies.
52 
Similar moves within the EU are likely to encounter parallel problems. The White 
Paper on Governance has been seen as an attempt to open up the technocratic process and 
boost its democratic credentials by insisting on not only greater openness but also 
consultation and participation.
53 However, despite the rhetoric about involving the 
‘general public’, the main proposals for consultation refer to ‘civil society organisations’, 
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‘interested parties’, ‘partners’ and ‘stakeholders’.
54 There is a single, ritually pious, 
reference to the importance of European political parties and none at all to their rather 
more substantial national counterparts. Although the White Paper recognises the dangers 
of consulting what are often self-selecting and unaccountable bodies, the proposals it 
offers for overcoming the resulting biases are largely superficial. Therefore, this policy 
still risks favouring well funded groups whose interests may well be at variance with that 
of the public at large. None of these groups need be particularly democratic themselves 
and involve the citizens they allegedly speak for in their decisions. This weakness is even 
truer of most consumer and public interest organisations than of certain producer groups. 
After all, unions at least have a degree of internal democracy. Worse, the ability of many 
NGOs to criticise regulatory proposals is often constrained by their reliance on EU funds, 
itself a sign of their low levels of membership
55. The Commission claims to be able 
exercise a general supervisory role, yet unlike elected national executives this too is a 
technocratic body. The ECJ has also been invoked as being able to ensure due process, 
yet this will either be purely formal or lead the Court into seeking to second guess the 
substantive conclusions of democracy. In fact, Americanisation has gone less far than 
delegatory theorists imagined, with the European Parliament playing an increasing part in 
overseeing comitology. However, if delegatory theorists are right in believing that the 
cleavage structure of the Union makes an EU demos unworkable, then the EP’s 
involvement will likewise involve a democratic deficit. In whichever case, the aspiration 
to substitute technocracy for democracy seems empirically and normatively questionable. 
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Conclusion 
Both the rights-based and the public-interest arguments attempt to over come the 
weaknesses of democratic legitimacy within the EU by positing an EU consensus that can 
be arrived at by a ‘non-political’ democratic procedure. At the same time, they tend to 
mischaracterise the nature and effects of the forms of majoritarian democratic 
accountability found in most of the Member States. Since neither their alternatives nor 
their criticisms appear that convincing, the standard versions of the EU’s democratic 
deficit retain their force. If an EU demos can be said to exist, then a move should be 
made towards enhancing the role played by directly elected majoritarian decision-making 
bodies within the EU. If, as seems more likely, an EU demos and public sphere remain 
absent with little immediate prospect of being established, then means need to be found 
for enhancing the democratic accountability of EU decision-makers within the 
established democracies of the Member States.
 56 Either way, the current limitations of 
EU democracy place democratic limits on what the EU should do - even in the name of 
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